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Abstract
This article examines two recent policy initiatives in Singapore: the independent schools scheme and the
autonomous schools scheme. The Singapore government has claimed that these reform initiatives, both
of which are aimed at promoting greater school operating autonomy, will help attain greater choice and
diversity for parents and students as well as promote excellence in education. The author examines the
operating framework of both schemes and concludes that even while these schemes purport to offer
school heads increased autonomy, the government continues to exert a great deal of influence over all
schools. In addition, the author is critical of the extent to which the policy objectives of these two
schemes will be attained.
1 Introduction
A prominent trend in several countries for the past two decades involves the devolution
of operating autonomy to schools in such matters as finance and staff recruitment. These
reforms have been occurring in countries as diverse as New Zealand, Canada, Hong
Kong, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan. The increased autonomy goes under
different names, for instance, ‘local management of schools’, ‘restructured schools’,
‘selfmanaging schools’, ‘school-based management’, or ‘site-based management’ (Cald-
well 1990; Hopkins, Ainscow, & West 1994; Mohrman & Wohlstetter 1994). At the
same time, there are also differences among various policy contexts in term of three main
variables: (a) the task areas over which autonomy is exercised; (b) the level at which the
autonomy is exercised; and (c) the degree of autonomy that is exercised and the extent to
which it is constrained by regulations and other forms of external control and
accountability (Bolam 1993).
This autonomy is regarded as an essential element in the move towards enabling
schools to function within a market model. It is believed that, among other things, the
devolution of certain aspects of decision-making to the school level will enhance edu-
cational effectiveness (Angus 1992; Bush, Coleman, & Glover 1993; Department for
Education and Employment 1996). First, it is argued that excessive centralization of de-
cision-making authority in government education departments leads to passive con-
formity, and to a slow and cumbersome decision-making process. Conversely, judge-
ments as to what is best for each school are better made by those closest to “the opera-
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tional point of service delivery” (Guthrie 1993: 246). Principals should be able to decide
what is best for their schools, taking into account their schools’ unique characteristics and
circumstances.
Secondly, it is hoped that delegating decision-making authority to school principals
will make them more accountable, not only to government, but also to other parties such
as parents (Brown 1990). Increased accountability should provide an impetus for princi-
pals to be more innovative and responsive to the needs of parents and students. Thirdly,
several governments are now actively extolling the merits of forcing schools to compete
among themselves for ‘customers’. These include the attainment of quality teaching and
learning as well as efficient, effective, and economic use of resources.
What is interesting is that in some cases, moves to grant school administrators greater
autonomy in terms of micro-policy areas are occurring alongside moves to increase cen-
tral government authority in macro-policy areas (Caldwell & Spinks 1992; Cummings &
Riddell 1994).
Schools are being held accountable through such measures as implementation of
national curricula, publicizing of performance indicators, and rewards for accomplishing
desired goals or sanctions for not doing so (Simkins 1993).
This article focuses on two experiments in granting increased school autonomy in
Singapore since the mid-1980s: the independent schools scheme and the autonomous
schools scheme. Selected secondary schools have been allowed greater autonomy in a
government attempt to foster educational innovation and promote excellence in edu-
cation. The article outlines the workings of the two schemes and argues that the Singa-
pore experiments illustrate the desire by government to devolve to school administrators
the authority and capacity to determine the ways in which schools may achieve govern-
ment-determined outcomes, rather than unbounded operating autonomy. The Ministry of
Education continues to exert a great deal of both direct and indirect influence over all
schools. At the same time, it is not entirely clear whether the desired policy goals will be
successfully attained. The discussion adds to the existing literature on school autonomy
and the accompanying policy implications.
2 The advent of increased school autonomy: Independent schools and
autonomous schools
The 1957 Education Ordinance included provisions for the registration of schools,
managers, and teachers, and provisions governing the role and responsibilities of school
management committees. The Ordinance was followed by regulations that gave govern-
ment and government-aided schools equal recurrent funding and that stated that staff
qualifications and salaries and fees should be the same in both types of school. In
addition the Director of Education was given control over staff recruitment and dismissal
in all schools. This marked the beginning of moves towards a highly centralized system
of education. Over the next decade further steps included the standardization of subject
syllabuses and educational structures across the various language streams, and the insti-
tution of common terminal examinations.
By the early 1980s, the tide of centralization had begun to turn. The then Director of
Schools declared in 1982 that the Ministry of Education wanted to decentralize educa-
tional management from the Ministry headquarters to the schools. A major boost to the
idea of freeing schools from centralized control was given by the then First Deputy Prime
Minister, Goh Chok Tong, in 1985. He spoke of the need to allow more autonomy within
schools, and of giving the right to appoint staff, devise school curricula, and choose
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textbooks, while conforming to national education policies such as bilingualism and
common examinations. Goh asserted that prestigious schools had lost some of their
individuality and special character through centralized control.
In 1986, 12 school principals were invited to accompany the Education Minister to
study the management of 25 “acknowledged successful schools” in the U.K. and U.S.A.,
and see what lessons could be learned for Singapore. The principals’ report recom-
mended greater autonomy for selected schools in order to “stimulate educational inno-
vation” and “to enable schools to respond more promptly to the needs and aspirations of
pupils and parents” (Ministry of Education 1987: ix).
Accepting the recommendations, Education Minister Tony Tan cited approvingly the
findings of Chubb and Moe, who had concluded that U.S. public schools performed less
well than private schools because they were sheltered from market forces. Tan stated that
several well-established schools would be allowed to become independent schools. They
would be given autonomy and flexibility in staff deployment and salaries, finance,
management, and the curriculum. These schools were to serve as role models for other
schools in improving the quality of education. They would also help set the market value
for good principals and teachers by recruiting staff in a competitive market. Parents,
teachers, and students would enjoy a wider variety of schools to choose from.
In 1987, three well-established boys‘ secondary schools announced their intentions to
go independent in 1988. Their applications for independent status were approved by the
Ministry of Education. They were followed a year later by two prestigious government-
aided girls‘ secondary schools. To date, a total of eight secondary schools, all of which
are well-established and prestigious, have become independent schools.
This move towards greater autonomy in school management must be viewed against
the background of increasing government concern over the role of education in moulding
Singapore’s future. In the wake of the 1985–86 recession, an Economic Committee
recommended, among other things, the education of each individual to his or her maxi-
mum potential, and the development of creativity and flexible skills in order to maintain
Singapore’s international economic competitiveness (Ministry of Trade and Industry
1986).
The need for creativity and innovation was repeated in a report by the Economic
Planning Committee in 1991 (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1991).
Right from the introduction of the independent school scheme, there was intense
public criticism over its elitist nature and the high fees charged by the schools. For
example, monthly independent school fees ranged between 50 and 100 Singapore dollars
in 1990, way above the S$ 10.50 fee in non-independent secondary schools (Tan 1996:
160). In response, the government established a Financial Assistance Scheme for
financially needy students attending these schools. It also reaffirmed its commitment to
providing large subsidies for basic education (Parliamentary Debates, 54, November 29,
1989, Col. 680). However, it insisted that parents had to be prepared to pay for high
quality education (Parliamentary Debates, 54, November 29, 1989, Cols. 673–674).
In the wake of the 1991 general elections, which saw the governing party returned to
power with a reduced parliamentary majority, the government took further steps to
defuse public criticism of the independent schools scheme. First, it limited the number of
independent schools, thus reversing its earlier announcement that it wanted to see more
schools turn independent. Secondly, a government-appointed Cost Review Committee
expressed concern over the high fees charged by independent schools and urged the
schools to keep their fees affordable (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1993). Thirdly, in
1994 it established a new category of schools called autonomous schools. In the first
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three years, 18 existing non-independent secondary schools, all of which had outstanding
academic results, were designated as autonomous schools. Unlike the independent
schools, which had to submit detailed proposals prior to gaining independent status, the
autonomous schools had their new-found status thrust upon them by the Education
Ministry. These schools were selected according to several criteria such as a sound track
record in academic performance, sports, and aesthetics, evidence of capable school
leadership, and geographic location. They were supposed to provide a high quality edu-
cation while charging more affordable fees than independent schools. Parents and
students were thus supposed to have a greater range of choices (Goh 1992a). One sees in
the promotion of the independent schools scheme and the autonomous schools scheme
the use of the language of market economics. Terms such as ‘choice’ and ‘competition’
are now commonplace in Education Ministry discourse, evidence of a growing marketi-
sation of education in Singapore (Tan 1998).
3 The Framework of Independent Schools and Autonomous Schools
3.1 Management Structure
Non-independent secondary schools are divided into two kinds: government and
government-aided. The former are run directly by the government while the latter are run
by either a School Management Board or a School Management Committee whose
members are approved by the Director of Education. These governing bodies have the
authority to decide (subject to the provisions of the Education Act and the Grant-in-Aid
Regulations) on such matters as fund-raising activities and the role and content of re-
ligious instruction. They may also appoint teachers who wish to become direct em-
ployees of the school (instead of being government employees). However, the govern-
ment continues to pay these teachers salaries. Government-run as well as government-
aided schools that have been designated as autonomous schools retain their previous
statuses.
Following the implementation of the independent schools scheme, the School Boards
(Incorporation) Act was passed in 1990. It provided for the establishment of governing
boards in independent schools. Each board could promulgate its own constitution and
could decide on the exact number of governors to be appointed. However, all such
appointments had to be approved by the Education Minister. Other indications of strong
Ministry influence permeated the Act. For instance, the Minister could vary or revoke the
constitution in consultation with the board. The Act also allowed for the Minister to
appoint the Director of Education to take over the running of schools if the Minister was
satisfied that a board had “failed to conduct the school efficiently or that the education of
pupils of the school [was] not being promoted in a proper manner” (Singapore 1991 a,
Section 10 (1)). Typical powers entrusted to governing boards of independent schools
include (a) the recruitment, promotion, dismissal, and disciplinary control of teaching and
non-teaching staff; (b) the determining of student fees; and (c) the establishment of
scholarships and endowments.
Another innovation in management structure in independent schools has involved the
recruitment of more top- and mid-level administrators, many of whom are full-time
administrators, to assist the principals. Each non-independent secondary school has a
vice-principal. In addition, since the mid-1990s the Education Ministry has allocated a
full-time school administrator to each non-independent school. In contrast, several inde-
pendent schools have hired more than one deputy or assistant principal as well as public
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relations officers, bursars, and estate officers. By hiring more administrators than are
allowed non-independent schools, principals of independent schools may be able better
to focus on providing professional and academic leadership (Tan 1996).
3.2 Finance
In launching the independent schools scheme, the Education Minister announced that the
government would pay each independent school a per capita grant equivalent to the
average cost of educating a secondary school student. All the independent schools remain
heavily dependent on the government for a substantial portion of their annual recurrent
funding (Tan 1996: 165). Another form of government financial assistance is through
contributions to independent schools’ endowment funds. The government matches
donations to these funds on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to the first million dollars.
Financial subsidies are also provided for the schools’ building projects. The government
provides 80 percent of these costs, 15 percent less its subsidy rate for aided schools.
Furthermore, there are large subsidies for students awarded government scholarships as
well as for students receiving money through the government-run Financial Assistance
Scheme for financially needy students in independent schools (Tan 1996).
A major innovation in independent schools, and an important feature of independent
schools vis-à-vis non-independent schools, is that the former are able to establish their
own fees. All the eight independent schools have taken advantage of this autonomy by
raising their fees upon turning independent. The monthly fees charged by independent
schools are much higher than those in non-independent schools, ranging between S$100
and S$200, compared with a range of between S$15 and S$32.10 in autonomous schools,
and between S$12 and S$14.10 in non-independent, non autonomous (NINA) schools.
All the independent schools have raised their fees at least twice since turning
independent. In fact, two of them have raised their fees four times within the span of five
years.
The government stand on independent school fees has been ambivalent. At times, it
has said that its responsibility does not extend to determining these schools’ fees, but
rather, ensuring that there are adequate financial assistance schemes available (Parlia-
mentary Debates, 54, November 29, 1989, Col. 674; 54, February 22, 1990, Col. 1046).
At other times, however, there are signs of government influence over the setting of fees.
For instance, in 1993 the Permanent Secretary of the Education Ministry revealed that the
Ministry had on several occasions objected to proposals for fee increases or had asked
the schools to reduce their proposed fee increases (Davie 1993).
The independent schools heavy dependence on government funding is naturally
accompanied by demands for accountability. For example, the schools, like their non-
independent counterparts, need to submit their accounts for annual Ministry auditing. An
independent school principal expressed his views on the situation thus:
“The Ministry must have some say ... The government, after all, gives us two-thirds of our
funds ... Therefore, what happens in the Ministry, what’s decided in the Ministry, automat i-
cally impinges on the school ...” (Tan 1996: 166).
Autonomous schools receive more generous funding than NINA schools. The former
each receive an extra 10 percent in annual per capita grants. In addition, autonomous
schools may charge extra monthly fees up to a government-determined maximum and
stay to receive matching government grants for part of these increased fees. Each
autonomous school may thus receive between 11 percent and 21 percent more in per
capita funding than a NINA school with the same student enrolment (Tan 1996).
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The additional funds available to each autonomous school from these grants and fees
are managed as an Autonomous School Fund (ASF), which is managed by a Fund
Management Committee. This Committee comprises the principal, teacher represen-
tatives, School Management Committee members, as well as members of the commu-
nity. Schools are bound by Ministry regulations to use the ASF money only for four main
purposes: enrichment programmes to improve the quality of teaching and learning; pur-
chase and maintenance of instructional resources and equipment; hiring of temporary
administrative and support staff; and staff training and development. Data obtained from
several autonomous schools indicate that spending priorities vary among schools and
even within schools from year to year (Tan 1996). Similar to independent schools, the
autonomous schools remain heavily dependent on government financial aid and are sub-
ject to detailed Ministry financial scrutiny.
3.3 Curriculum Policy
In some respects, all schools, whether NINA, autonomous, or independent, enjoy an
equal amount of discretion to be innovative. For example, variations in teaching
methodologies and approaches, as well as emphasis in pastoral care programmes and
extra curricular activities, may be carried out relatively freely. In some other respects,
independent schools have clearly been more innovative than non-independent schools as
a result of the greater degree of leeway they have been allowed by the Education
Ministry. First, a few independent schools have broken away from standard assessment
practices such as the conducting of examinations in the middle of the school year.
Secondly, several subjects such as Home Economics that are mandatory examinable
subjects in non-independent schools have been made non-examinable in a few inde-
pendent schools. Thirdly, independent schools have added new subjects or have scrapped
subjects that are mandatory in non-independent schools. For instance, all the four
independent boys schools have scrapped Design and Technology and have replaced it
with their individually designed Computer Studies courses.
At the same time, though, not all the independent schools have been equally inno-
vative. The Chinese High School has stood out as one of the more innovative inde-
pendent schools. It is the only Singapore school to offer its own gifted education pro-
gramme in direct competition with that offered by the Education Ministry in three other
independent schools and one autonomous school (Lim 1997). The school designed and
started the programme without any Ministry assistance. In addition, its programme
differs from the Ministry’s programme in several key respects. Another innovation
undertaken by this school has been the offering of consultancy services to a Singapore
international school that was established in the Chinese city of Suzhou in 1996. The
services include curriculum design, teacher recruitment, and the establishment of a
training infrastructure (Tan 1996).
It should be pointed out that non-independent schools would never be able to under-
take initiatives such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. For one thing, they
are forbidden to recruit extra staff. Secondly, they lack the necessary funds. Only an
independent school would be able to marshal the necessary funds to recruit the extra staff
and purchase the resources to start such a programme without any financial or personal
assistance from the Education Ministry.
However, in some other respects the degree of choice and diversity that independent
schools offer parents and students is still rather limited. The government still exerts a
great deal of influence over all 147 secondary schools. In particular, the imposition of
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national curricular requirements such as bilingualism, the teaching of moral education
and common national examinations, restricts the scope for curricular innovation. None of
the independent schools have moved away from a subject-based curriculum. In addition,
the range of subjects offered in these schools is still largely identical to that in non-inde-
pendent schools.
A second major factor inhibiting innovation is conservatism and resistance to change
among some Education Ministry officials. Such attitudes often prove frustrating for
school principals who desire greater autonomy from Ministry control, as manifested for
instance in this statement by the principal of an independent school:
“So the system on the one hand allows it [autonomy], on the other hand chokes it ... There’s a
gap here. You’ve got the rules in the middle, on one side. You’ve got the people interpreting
them ... the inspectors. You’ve got the school principal, who’s got to abide by the rules and be
inspected by the inspector who works for the rules, because he’s accountable to his bosses. So
if this principal doesn’t observe that rule fully, the inspector’s got to account for that principal
and give the answer up here ... And yet the Director on top is saying, “But if you read the rules,
they’ve [referring to school principals] got a lot of freedom” (Tan 1996: 218).
There are thus tensions between centralizing tendencies in the Ministry on the one hand,
and the desire by some principals to exercise their professional judgement on the other
hand. The former Director of Education has recognized the existence of conservatism
and resistance to change within the Ministry: “I suspect that decentralization efforts may
have been resisted by some Ministry officials who are reluctant to yield authority or share
their power” (Yip 1982: 6).
A third factor circumscribing the scope of curricular innovation in all secondary
schools, not just independent secondary schools, in Singapore relates to the coupling of
examination pressures with those induced by the annual ranking of all secondary schools.
This ranking has been carried out since 1992 as part of a government attempt to foster
keen competition among schools. The Prime Minister has stated the competition will
improve the quality of education and provide parents and students with a wider range of
choices. Schools will also be made more accountable, thus forcing them to improve their
programmes (Goh 1992b).
Secondary schools are ranked on three main criteria. The first of these is a measure of
student’s overall results in national examinations. Next schools value-addedness is
evaluated by comparing students’ performance in national examinations with their
examination scores upon entry to their respective secondary schools. In 1995 the
Ministry began giving cash awards to the 40 secondary schools that were most highly
ranked in the annual value-added league tables. The third criterion is a weighted index
that measures a school’s performance in the national Physical Fitness Test as well as the
percentage of overweight students in the school. The publication of the league tables in
the local press is supposed to provide parents and students with better information so that
they might make intelligent and informed choices (Goh 1992b).
It is highly debatable whether fostering competition does improve the quality of edu-
cation for all students and promote greater choice and diversity for parents and students.
This is especially so in the Singapore context for a number of reasons. First of all, the
competition among schools does not take place on a level playing field. The terms of
competition are to a large extent dictated by the government. For instance, the number of
independent schools and autonomous schools is determined by the government. Next,
unlike independent schools, non-independent schools may not decide their enrolment
figures or the number of teachers they wish to employ. Furthermore, not all schools may
offer certain prestigious academic programmes such as the Gifted Education Programme.
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The government only conducts such programmes in selected schools, all of which are
either independent or autonomous. The Chinese High School was able to establish its
own Gifted Education Programme in competition with that of the Ministry in large part
because it was an independent school with ample financial resources. It is questionable to
what extent all school principals can engage in activities such as the provision of con-
sultancy services and the establishment of branch schools in other countries.
In other words, non-prestigious, non academically selective schools are simply unable
to compete effectively with well-established, academically selective schools. The former
are caught in a vicious cycle: because they are unable to attract high academic achievers,
their academic results fall far below those of the well established schools. This in turn
means that they remain unable to attract high academic achievers. Analysis of the
ranking results for national examination scores from 1992 to 1996 reveals that the
majority of the top 30 secondary schools have remained in this category over the five
years. In particular, the top four school have remained the same over this period. It is
therefore questionable to what extent increased competition actually helps to improve
standards in all schools.
A second criticism is that competition leads some schools to focus narrowly on those
outcomes that are relevant for public ranking and that may be useful for attracting parents
and potential students. Such a criticism is especially relevant in a situation such as
Singapore where one’s performance in competitive examinations is a major determinant
of educational and social mobility. Ample evidence for this criticism was provided
during the controversy in 1995 over the teaching of English literature by some secondary
schools. Some prestigious schools had decided to make the subject optional rather than
compulsory for their graduating students. This was because English literature was widely
perceived to be a subject in which it was difficult to do well during national
examinations. These schools were wary of the potential consequences that students’ less-
than-ideal performance in English Literature might have on their positions in the annual
ranking exercises (Nirmala & Mathi 1995). An independent school principal has spoken
of the dilemma he faces in deciding curriculum policy for his students, of having to
“compromise my subject offerings to try and find a middle ground, where I’ve got one
eye on ranking and one eye on what I want to do with the kids” (Tan 1996: 243).
Another piece of evidence that points to the adverse effect of ranking schools is the
tendency on the part of some schools to over-emphasize preparation for the national
physical fitness test at the expense of the acquisition of skills in sports and games
(Physical Education 1996). The growing stress on school accountability and the use of
narrowly defined, easily quantifiable performance indicators has clearly had a detrimen-
tal impact on some schools. Far from promoting choice and diversity, heightened inter-
school competition and rivalry may in fact work against these goals. The growing
obsession among many school principals with maintaining or enhancing school ranking
positions in the league tables does not augur well for curricular innovation (although
some of the strategies that are used towards this end could no doubt be considered rather
dubious innovations).
Another criticism is that the current performance indicators are not in fact very
meaningful. The differences in performance between the top-ranked schools are often so
minuscule as to be of little use to parents and students in helping them choose a particular
school. Various observers have suggested refinements to the performance indicators in
order to provide more information about the non-academic aspects of school life.
However, these invariably involve quantifiable measures. Thus, those aims and goals of
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education that are less amenable to quantification, such as moral development, continue
to be given less emphasis.
3.4 Enrolment Policy
All secondary schools are assigned a new batch of students at the end of each school year
a centralized system operated by the Education Ministry. Several factors such as indi-
vidual students performance in the national primary school leaving examinations,
students choices of secondary school, and the physical capacity of individual schools,
determine the final outcomes of this annual exercise. Since not all schools are equal in
prestige, there is tremendous pressure to secure admission to the more prestigious schools
at all levels of the education system. When the Ministry gave the green light in 1987 for
the establishment of independent schools, it announced that these schools would continue
to admit students primarily on the basis of academic merit as determined by their results
in the national primary school leaving examinations. Independent schools with affiliated
primary schools could continue giving priority in admission to students from these
affiliated schools.
The granting of greater autonomy in terms of enrolment policy has paved the way for
several major innovations in independent schools. First, at least three independent
schools took steps during the initial years of independent status to reduce their annual
intakes. Secondly, at least six independent schools have reduced their class sizes com-
pared to what they were before the schools became independent. Thirdly, at least seven
schools have improved their teacher-student ratios relative to those in non-independent
schools (Tan 1996). Greater autonomy in terms of both finance and staff recruitment has
played an important role influencing independent schools’ enrolment policy decisions.
Now that these schools are free to charge higher fees than non-independent schools, and
to hire as many teachers as they can afford, they are able to hire more teachers in order to
improve teacher-student ratios.
Although independent schools enjoy a much greater degree of autonomy in enrolment
policy vis-à-vis non-independent schools, the Education Ministry continues to play a
heavy role, both direct and indirect, in influencing enrolment (Tan 1996). First, it
continues to offer special academic programmes in several of the schools and to provide
staffing, financial, and resource support for the conduct of these programmes. Secondly,
it has on occasion admonished principals who have aroused public controversy through
their enrolment decisions. Thirdly, the last two schools to turn independent have had to
respond to public disquiet over the perceived elitism involved in allowing independent
schools to reduce their class sizes. The principals of both these schools pledged to main-
tain their current class sizes at the same time that they announced their schools’ intention
to turn independent.
A major pressure bearing upon independent schools’ enrolment policy decisions is the
need to attract top-scoring students and maintain school prestige amid the current climate
of intense inter-school competition that has been fostered by the Education Ministry. All
the independent schools were already academically selective prior to turning
independent. The advent of annual school league tables, along with government
statements that independent schools are meant to nurture the future social and political
elite of Singapore, has only intensified the drive towards academic selectiveness. For
instance, two independent schools with affiliated primary schools have revised policies
allowing automatic admission for students from affiliated schools who meet government-
determined minimum entry scores for admission. Both these schools have faced a two-
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pronged dilemma after turning independent. On the one hand, they have had to deal with
the commitment to governing boards, alumni, and parents of students from affiliated
primary schools in terms of preferential admission policies. On the other hand, there has
been a need to tighten admission requirements so as to strengthen the schools’ com-
petitiveness in the annual league tables. As a result of more stringent admission policies,
the percentage of students in these two independent schools that come from affiliated
primary schools has dropped drastically in the past few years. One principal explained
the rationale for his decision in the following manner:
“... if I keep coming down in ranking, I’ll get less of the better kids. Because parents’ per-
ception would be, ‘It’s not a good school.’ ... So you’re on a downward slide. So the only way
you can turn it around ... is ... to the cohort ...” (Tan 1996: 200).
4 Conclusion
The Singapore government has attempted over the past decade to promote school auton-
omy through the independent schools scheme and the autonomous schools scheme.
Among the supposed benefits are greater choice and diversity through innovation in
schools, which in turn leads to excellence in educational provision. To date, there are
eight independent schools and 18 autonomous schools out of a total of 147 secondary
schools.
One key observation is that even while school heads been given greater operating
autonomy in certain respects, the government continues to exert considerable influence
over all schools. For example, schools are still bound by nationally prescribed exami-
nations. In other words, schools are being given greater autonomy in order that they
might better achieve government-dictated macro-policy objectives and goals. In view of
the central roles that the government has assigned to the education system in supporting
economic development and fostering social cohesion (Gopinathan 1995), it is highly un-
likely that centralized control will ever be relaxed. It might also be argued that there are
benefits to having a certain amount of centralized control schools. One of these is the
need to ensure that all children enjoy similar access to a basic general education.
However, the imposition of centralized control may conflict with the promotion of
choice and diversity. None of the independent schools or autonomous schools, not to
mention NINA schools, have been able to stray from nationally prescribed examinations.
Furthermore, intense interschool competition has led some school heads to focus
narrowly on the attainment of results that are published in the annual school league
tables.
The government has claimed that it plans to extend the lessons learned from the two
schemes to all schools and to provide all school heads with more operating autonomy
(Parliamentary Debates, 67, August 25, 1997, Col. 1623). Since 1997, 59 schools have
been grouped into various “clusters”, each of which is headed by a group senior prin-
cipal. This particular individual has been provided with autonomy in financial and staff
training decisions. In addition, the independent schools and autonomous schools have
been held up as role models for other schools to emulate in terms of improving educa-
tional standards. This of course begs the question of whether what proves effective in
these relatively well-established and prestigious schools can in fact be transplanted into
other schools. The government’s reasoning also ignores the part played by a selective
student intake in schools’ academic success. It is therefore not clear the extent to which
the experience of the independent schools and autonomous schools can be valid lessons
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for the bulk of Singapore secondary schools, struggling with less-than-ideal student
ability levels.
Another worrying trend is the increasing stratification of schools, one which is being
fuelled by the feverish pursuit among some school heads of ever-improving academic
results and school league table rankings. As the top becomes ever more academically
selective, there is also evidence that students from wealthier homes are overrepresented
in these schools (Tan 1993). Another related danger, therefore, relates to the potential for
social stratification. This latter issue has already caused concern among various aca-
demics (Chua 1996; Da Cunha 1997).
Although the government is aware of the potential political fallout from the public
controversy over social inequalities, it shows no sign of reversing its experiments in
school autonomy and its promotion of the language of market economics in education
policy. If anything, it is likely to further encourage competitions among schools. This is
part of its urging of all Singaporeans to constantly “stay ahead of the pack” in terms of
global economics competitiveness (Lee 1994). Creativity and innovation have once again
been stressed as the keys to economic competitiveness (Parliamentary Debates, 67, July
30, 1997, Col. 1403). At the same time, it has urged Singaporeans not to allow “our
Children to be softened” by the alleged denigration of academic excellence and the pro-
motion of a “soft approach to life” by liberals in the West” (Goh 1992b). Thus, for
instance, it rejected a recent recommendation by an external curriculum review
committee that school ranking should be scrapped (Ministry of Education 1998). Its
response to criticism of the elitist nature of independent schools has been confused at
times. For instance, it has tried to dispel the notion that non-independent schools are
inferior to independent schools (Parliamentary Debates, 63, August 25, 1994, Col. 398).
At the same time, though, it has stated that the independent schools are to be developed
into “outstanding institutions, to give the most promising and able students an education
matching their promise” (Parliamentary Debates, 59, January 6, 1992, Col. 18.
This article has raised several interesting policy implications and dilemmas. It is
likely that the various policy tensions, such as the balance between centralization and
autonomy, will continue to feature prominently in the Singapore Education system. At
the same time, it is still not clear that the intended objectives initiatives such as the inde-
pendent schools scheme and the autonomous schools scheme will be attained, and if so,
at what cost to students, parents, and broader educational objectives.
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